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The implicit goal of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia has been to force the Serbian (Yugoslavian)
government back to the negotiation table so the government can sign a political agreement that has
already been signed by representatives of the Kosovar Albanians. The agreement encompasses--among
other items--autonomy for Kosovo (best translated as autonomy for Kosovar Albanians only), removal of
most Yugoslav and Serbian security forces from Kosovo, and introduction of NATO peacekeeping forces.
Not only has the NATO bombing been unsuccessful in effecting this goal, but the regime of Slobodan
Milosevic has been successful in goal subversion. True to form--based on earlier conflicts with Western
powers--Milosevic's regime has induced a greater evil than that evil whose sought-for termination
became a Western goal. In the present case, by terminating the greater evil--the ethnic cleansing
operations in Kosovo (preferably after they have already been largely effected)--Milosevic would allow
the Western powers to declare victory, even though their initial definition of victory (the signing of the
agreement) would not be met and even though Milosevic's regime would come out politically stronger
than before the bombing.
Here are some supporting attributions. From President Clinton--peace would only come when Mr.
Milosevic ended…a campaign of terror in Kosovo. From Hillary Rodham Clinton--NATO allies are
determined to persevere until Milosevic has embraced peace. From the NATO commander General
Wesley Clark--Serbian…forces would continue to be attacked, degraded, and disrupted…unless
President Milosevic called off the Serbian attacks. From the United Nation Secretary General Javier
Solana--We are going to continue the bombing until we can guarantee that the killings stop and will not
restart. (See the two New York Times articles below.)
The delinking of a security intervention from one goal to another and the concurrent continuation of
that intervention does not bode well for those who profess to be using force to make the world a better
place. It bodes very well for the power of Slobodan Milosevic. (See Bagozzi, R.P., Baumgartner, H., &
Pieters, R. (1998). Goal-directed emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 12, 1-26; Erlanger, S. (March 31,
1999). Even Milosevic foes criticize Western media. The New York Times, p. A10; Gollwitzer, P.M., &
Brandstaetter,V. (1997). Implementation intentions and effective goal pursuit. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 73, 186-199; Peressini, A. (1997). Psychological explanation and behavior broadly
conceived. Behavior and Philosophy, 25, 137-159; Whitney, C.R. (March 31, 1999). On 7th day, doubts
nag. The New York Times, p. A1; A8.) (Keywords: Bombings, Goal-Directed Behavior, Kosovo, NATO,
Security, Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslavia.)
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